The Right Coast

October 13, 2003
 
Conventional Wisdom Wrong on Political Effect of Affirmative Action Initiatives
By Gail Heriot

A Michigan Civil Rights Initiative similar to California's Proposition 209, which passed by a wide margin in 1996, is currently being proposed. If passed, it would prohibit the State of Michigan from discriminating or granting preferential treatment on the basis of race, sex, color, ethicity or national origin.

Conventional wisdom has it that when such initiatives are put on the ballot, Republican candidates are hurt even though they tend to side with majority opinion in opposing racial preferences. The reason is voter turnout. Those who oppose racial and gender preferences seldom consider the issue to be the most important issue of the day. Hence putting it on the ballot will seldom cause them to turn out to vote if they were not going to do so anyway. On the other hand, those who favor such programs may bother to show up only because the issue is on the ballot. Once there, they vote for Democrats.

Under this view, it doesn’t matter whether voters overwhelmingly oppose racial preferences (as indeed polls indicate.) Nor does it matter that initiatives opposing racial preferences tend to pass by strong margins. All that matters is that having the issue on the ballot might induce a number of Democrats to turn out at the polls who otherwise would not have, thus disadvantaging Republican candidates.

The conventional wisdom is not ridiculous on its face. Certain hot-button issues do indeed affect voter turnout in the way that the theory suggests. In 1994, for example, California’s Proposition 187, which prohibited the state from providing certain taxpayer-supported services to illegal immigrants, Latino voters clearly and unequivocally turned out in greater numbers than they otherwise would have. In California, 50% of voting-age Latino citizens voted that year as contrasted with 34% in New York, 39% in Florida, 29% in Texas and 33% in the rest of the United States. Although California Latinos had traditionally voted in greater numbers than Latinos in other parts of the country, the gap has neither before nor since been as large as it was in 1994. Hence while Proposition 187 itself passed overwhelmingly (with quite a few Latino votes in its favor), it is likely that Democratic candidates picked up some votes they would not have otherwise gotten. The effect was small. Republican Governor Pete Wilson, a strong supporter of Proposition 187, was nevertheless re-elected by a strong margin. Indeed, some commentators attributed his victory to his support for Proposition 187.

The question is whether there is any support for the conventional wisdom as applied to Proposition 209. The answer is no. The bump in minority turnout that the conventional theory predicts did not occur. The turnout of voting age African American citizens actually went down from 67% in 1992 (the next previous Presidential election) to 65% in 1996; Latino numbers held steady at 54%. These California numbers do not by themselves disprove the conventional wisdom, since white turnout declined even more steeply form 1992 to 1996. But they put it in doubt.

And when one compares California with other states, the conventional wisdom is discredited entirely. The pattern in California–big drop in white vote turnout relative to 1992, modest drop in black turnout–was mirrored throughout the country. This is reflective of a long-term trend towards higher levels of black voting. In some states, like Texas, the effect was even greater than it was in California. Yet in Texas there was no Proposition 209. It is difficult enough to account for how Proposition 209 could have caused higher than expected turnout for African Americans not just in California but around the country. Accounting for how it could have affected African Americans in Texas more profoundly than African Americans in California is just impossible.

Republican fear of addressing the issue is thus misplaced and Republicans need not fear taking a principled stand against racial preferences. The turnout issue turns out to be a chimera. Indeed, taking principled positions may do the GOP some good with minority voters. While George W. Bush received a only 9% of the African American vote, Proposition 209 received 26% according to exit polls.

Why was Proposition 209 so different from Proposition 187 in its effect on voter turnout? Among potential voters, Proposition 187 had its most profound effect on recently-naturalized Latinos who often had friends or relatives in the country illegally. These recently-naturalized Latinos are likely to be less well-educated and less affluent than the average voter, including the average Latino voter. Since less well-educated and less affluent citizens do not vote in high numbers whatever their race or ethnicity, when an issue comes along that concerns them specifically, they have plenty of room to ratchet up their turnout. Proposition 209, on the other hand, primarily affected middle and upper income African Americans and Latinos. These groups already enjoy relatively high voter participation. Indeed, when African Americans are matched with whites with similar socio-economic factors, African American often vote at higher levels than whites. And although Latinos are somewhat less likely to vote than whites with similar socio-economic factors, the gap is small. As a result, it is difficult for them to increase their numbers at the polls. There simply isn’t much room for improvement.

Why does the conventional wisdom persist despite the lack of evidence to support it? If a small group of preference supporters wanted to persuade a larger but less-focused group to leave the issue along, what better way to do it than to argue that it will be costly to them on issues they care more about? They emphasize their voter turnout theory to the media, which then report the theories as fact. In time, such propaganda becomes the conventional wisdom.